Barbara Montero

Professor

Most of Professor Montero's research has focused on one or the other of two very different notions of body: body as the physical or material basis of everything, and body as the moving, breathing, flesh and blood instrument that we use when we run, walk, or dance. The first line of research has led her to question a standard way of thinking about physicalism as the theory that everything will be, in some sense, accountable for by science. The second line of research has led her to think about proprioception. She is especially interested in the kind of information proprioception provides us with and the kinds of judgments proprioception helps to enable. Professor Montero has been a recipient of a National Endowment for the Humanities Research Fellowship and an American Council of Learned Societies Charles Ryskamp Research Fellowship.

Degrees

BA, University of California (Berkeley)

PhD, University of Chicago

Scholarship and Publications

Physicalism Could Be True Even If Mary Learns Something New,

Philosophical Quarterly, 57 (2007) pp. 176-189.



What Does the Conservation of Energy Have to Do with Physicalism?

Dialectica, 60:4 (2006), pp. 383-396.



Proprioceiving Someone Elses Movement, /Philosophical Explorations,

9:2 June (2006) pp. 149-161.



Proprioception as an Aesthetic Sense, Aesthetics and Art Criticism,

64: 2 (2006) pp. 231-242.



Physicalism in an Infinitely Decomposable World, Erkentnis, 64: 2

(2006) pp. 177-191.



The Via Negativa Argument for Physicalism, co-written with David

Papineau, Analysis, Vol. 65, No. 3 (2005) pp. 233-237.



Consciousness is Puzzling, but Not Paradoxical, Philosophy and

Phenomenological Research, 69: 1 (2004) pp. 213-226.



The Epistemic Ontic Divide,Philosophy and Phenomenological

Research, 66: 2 (2003) pp. 404-418.



New Inconsistencies in Infinite Utility: Is Every World Good, Bad or

Neutral?, co-written with D. Fishkind and J. Hamkins, Australasian

Journal of Philosophy, 80: 2 (2002) pp. 178-190.



Post-Physicalism,Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8: 2 (2001) pp.

61-80.



Reprinted in Arguing About the Mind, B. Gertler and L. Shapiro,

eds. (Routledge) (2007), pp. 97-104.



With Infinite Utility, More Needn’t be Better, co-written with J.

Hamkins, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 2 (2000) pp. 231-240.



Utilitarianism in Infinite Worlds, co-written with J. Hamkins,

Utilitas, 12: 1 (2000) pp. 91-96.

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Contact Information

Office: Building 2N Room 231